Trademark Law and Parallel Imports in a Globalized World--Recent Developments in Europe with Special Regard to the Legal Situation in the United States by Baudenbacher, Carl
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 22, Issue 3 1998 Article 1
Trademark Law and Parallel Imports in a
Globalized World–Recent Developments in
Europe with Special Regard to the Legal
Situation in the United States
Carl Baudenbacher∗
∗
Copyright c©1998 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Trademark Law and Parallel Imports in a
Globalized World–Recent Developments in
Europe with Special Regard to the Legal
Situation in the United States
Carl Baudenbacher
Abstract
This Article discusses the historic course of recent events insofar as it first describes the
Maglite decision of the European Free Trade Association Court. Second, it summarizes the opin-
ion of the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities in the Silhouette case. Part III focuses on the development of the law in the European
Union (”EU”) and European Economic Area (”EEA”) Member States, as well as in the EU and in
the EEA before Silhouette and Maglite. In Part IV, comments are made with regard to the reasons
given in Maglite and Silhouette. Finally, some conclusions are drawn concerning the consequences
of the new case law on international trade and possible further developments in European Com-
munity (“EC” or “Community”) law.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 16, 1998, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities ("ECJ") delivered its preliminary ruling in Silhouette In-
ternational Schmied Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer Handel-
sgesellschaft mbH.1 The ECJ held that national rules providing for
the international exhaustion of trademark rights are incompati-
ble with Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive.2 The provi-
sion of the Directive reads as follows: "The trademark shall not
entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods
which have been put on the market in the Community under
that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent." In ac-
cordance with Article 65(2), in conjunction with Annex XVII,
point 4, of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2
May 1992 ("EEA Agreement"), Article 7(1) was amended for the
purposes of the EEA Agreement so that the expression "in the
Community" has been replaced by "in a Contracting Party." Arti-
cle 7 of the Trade Mark Directive was transposed into Austrian
law by Paragraph 10(a) of the Markenschutzgesetz (Law on the
Protection of Trademarks), the first subparagraph of which pro-
vides: "The right conferred by the trademark shall not entitle
* Judge of the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") Court; Professor of Pri-
vate, Commercial and Economic Law, University of St. Gallen; Visiting Professor, Uni-
versity of Texas School of Law. The Article is dedicated to DBT and LB in remem-
brance of Vals 1998/99.
1. Silhouette International Schmied Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [19981 E.C.R. 1-4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953.
2. First Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC, O.J. L 40/1 (1989) (discussing approx-
imating laws of Member States relating to trade marks) [hereinafter Trade Mark Direc-
tive], as amended by Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992, O.J. L
1/3 (1994) [hereinafter EEA Agreement].
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the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using it in relation
to goods which have been put on the market in the European
Economic Area under that trademark by the proprietor or with
his consent." The ECJjudgment hardly came as a surprise.3 On
January 29, 1998, Advocate General Francis Jacobs had urged
the ECJ to adopt the position that it did.4
Silhouette is, at first glance, contrary to what the European
Free Trade Association Court ("EFTA Court") held in its Maglite
decision of December 3, 1997.1 In fact, the EFTA Court said that
it is for the EFTA States being Contracting Parties to the EEA
Agreement (i.e., the legislators and courts of EFTA States) to
decide whether they want to introduce or to maintain the princi-
ple of international exhaustion of rights conferred by a trade-
mark with regard to goods originating outside the European
Economic Area ("EEA").
The ECJ's Silhouette judgment not only will affect consumers
and producers in the European Union (or "EU"), but also will
have effects on other parts of the world. This Article discusses
the historic course of recent events insofar as it will first describe
the Maglite decision of the EFTA Court. Second, it summarizes
the opinion of the Advocate General and the judgment of the
ECJ in the Silhouette case. Part III focuses on the development of
the law in the EU and EEA Member States, as well as in the Euro-
pean Union and in the EEA before Silhouette and Maglite. In Part
IV, comments will be made with regard to the reasons given in
Maglite and Silhouette. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn
concerning the consequences of the new case law on interna-
tional trade and possible further developments in European
Community ("EC" or "Community") law.
3. See Frederick M. Abbott & D.W. Feer Verkade, The Silhouette Trojan Horse: Reflec-
tions on the Advocate GeneralJacobs' Opinion in Silhouette v. Hartlauer, BIJBLAD Bij DE INDUS-
TRIPLE EIGENDOM, Apr. 1998, at 111; William R. Cornish, Trade Marks: Portcullis for the
EEA?, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., May 1998, at 172; Barbara E. Cookson, Europe Awaits
Controversial Ruling on Trademark Exhaustion: ECJ's decision in Silhouette seems likely to anger
consumers and non-EU countries, INTELL. PROP. WORLDWIDE, July/Aug. 1998, at 1.
4. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Silhouette International Schmied & Co.
KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case .C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799, -'
[1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953, 956.
5. MAG Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, Case E-2/97,
1997 Rep. EFTA Ct. 127, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 331 [hereinafter Maglite].
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I. EFTA COURT'S POSITION IN MAGLITE: INTERNATIONAL
EXHAUSTION OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS IS GOOD FOR
CONSUMERS, COMPETITION, AND FREE TRADE
A. Preliminary Remarks Concerning the Legal Position of the EFTA
Court in the European Economic Area
1. Relationship of the EFTA Court to National Courts in
Preliminary Ruling Proceedings
According to Article 34 of the Agreement Between the
EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority
and a Court of Justice ("SCA"), the EFTA Court is competent to
give "advisory opinions on the interpretation of the EEA Agree-
ment."' If such an interpretational question arises before any
court or tribunal of an EFTA State, then the court may request
the EFTA Court to give an opinion if it regards the opinion as
necessary for it to be able to render judgment. The term "EEA
Agreement" refers to both "the main part of the EEA Agree-
ment, its Protocols and Annexes as well as the acts referred to
therein."7 The procedure is largely analogous to the ECJ's pre-
liminary reference procedure under Article 177 of the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Community ("EC Treaty").8
Unlike the case of the ECJ, a preliminary ruling of the EFTA
Court is not legally binding upon the national court that has re-
6. Agreement Between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance
Authority and a Court of Justice, art. 34, O.J. L 344/1, at 5 (1994), modified by agree-
ment of December 29, 1994, reprinted in 1992 FORDHtAM CORP. L. INST. 464 (Barry Hawk
ed., 1993) [hereinafter SCA]; see Thinam Jakob, EEA and Eastern European Agreements
with the European Community, 1992 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INST. 403 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993)
(concerning EEA Agreement); Sven Norberg, The EEA Agreement: Institutional Solutions
for a Dynamic and Homogeneous EEA in the Area of Competition, 1992 FoRDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 437 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993); SVEN NORBERG ET AL., THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
AREA: EEA LAw: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEA AGREEMENT (1993). The EEA Agreement
is reprinted in 1992 FOIUHAM CORP. L. INST. 480 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993).
7. SCA, supra note 6, art. 1(a), O.J. L 344/1, at 1 (1994).
8. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 177, OJ. C
224/1, at 63 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 689 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating
changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]. For details, see Olivier Jacot-Guil-
larmod, La Procdure d'avis consultatif devant la future Cour AELE, in MELANGES EN
L'HONNEUR DEJACQUES-MICHEL GROSSEN 411 (1992); Carl Baudenbacher, Between Homo-
geneity and Independence: The Legal Position of the EFTA Court in the European Economic Area,
3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169, 185 (1997).
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quested it, the reason being that some EFTA States feared consti-
tutional problems if the EC system was adopted in its entirety. It
has been said that EFTA Court decisions are of persuasive au-
thority.9 Yet this point needs some elaboration. The concept of
persuasive authority is originally a common law concept that is
part of the doctrine of precedent. A decision of a court is prece-
dent only within the jurisdiction of that court. Judgments of
courts outside the jurisdiction of the court that has to give a rul-
ing are not binding, but may be of persuasive authority.'" The
court in question is, however, free to decide whether it finds
such a judgment persuasive." The difference in degree of influ-
ence between a local precedent and an out-of-state decision has
been compared to the difference "between the holding of a case
and a dictum in a judicial opinion, the 'holding' being fully au-
thoritative and generally binding and the 'dictum' only, again,
persuasive authority. "12
The obligation of a national court of an EEA/EFTA State
that has referred a question to the EFTA Court to follow the
EFTA Court's ruling clearly goes further than that. The EEA
Agreement itself is based on the assumption that the national
court will follow the EFTA Court's decision. There is no other
explanation for the EEA Agreement's concern with a homogene-
ous development of the case law of the EFTA Court on the one
side and of the ECJ on the other.13 At least indirectly, prelimi-
nary rulings of the EFTA Court are to be considered legally bind-
9. See Baudenbacher, supra note 8, at 189.
10. SeeJANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS 6 (1996).
11. For example, U.S. appellate courts exhibit a marked degree of comity, mutual
respect, for one another's decisions. Some decisions will have greater influence than
others on the thinking of judges in other states. The prestige of the court that ren-
dered the decision, or the prestige of the particular judge who wrote the opinion of the
court, may also affect the persuasiveness of the decision to the courts of other jurisdic-
tions. Id.
12. Id.
13. See EEA Agreement, supra note 2, art. 105, OJ. L 1/3, at 26 (1994). Article 105
enjoins the EEAJoint Committee to "preserve the homogeneous interpretation of the
Agreement." Id. For this purpose, the Committee is obliged to "keep under constant
review the development of the case law of the Court ofJustice of the European Commu-
nities and the EFTA Court. To this end, the judgments of these Courts shall be trans-
mitted to the EEA Joint Committee which shall act so as to preserve the homogeneous
interpretation of the Agreement." Id. The Agreement does not, however, denominate
the means available to the Committee to fulfill this function. Article 105(1) only states
that the Committee "shall act," with the objective of attaining as uniform an interpreta-
tion of the agreement as possible. For details, see Baudenbacher, supra note 8, at 219.
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ing; if the national court does not react to rulings that find parts
of an EFTA State's law incompatible with EEA law, then this
would amount to a violation of the EEA Agreement by the EFTA
State concerned. The same holds true with regard to the na-
tional legislator. 14 With regard to the results, there is hardly a
difference between the EC and the EEA system. 5
2. Relationship of the EFTA Court to the ECJ
The basic idea of the EEA Agreement consists in the Com-
munity granting the EFTA States free access to the European
internal market and the EFTA States taking on essential parts of
the EC economic law. The EEA law and the EC law are there-
fore to a large extent identical. In order to safeguard a homoge-
neous development of the case law, the EFTA Court is, as a mat-
ter of principle, bound to follow ECJ precedent. These homoge-
neity rules are based on the assumption that a new legal question
is decided by the ECJ first. According to Article 6 of the EEA
Agreement, the EFTA Court shall follow ECJ case law from the
time before the signing of the Agreement on May 2, 1992, pro-
vided that the rulings were based on EC law provisions that are
identical in substance to the EEA provisions being interpreted in
a given case. For the subsequent period, Article 3(2) of the Sur-
veillance and Court Agreement stipulates that the EFTA Court
shall pay due account to the ECJ case law. Practical experience
shows, however, that the EFTA Court is in almost every case con-
fronted with issues with which the ECJ has not yet dealt.
B. Facts and Procedure
This going-first constellation was also present in Maglite.
There was, as the EFTA Court explicitly noted, no relevant ECJ
precedent that could have been binding.16
14. In the case of the legislator, the EFTA Surveillance Authority ("ESA") would
bring an action for violation of the Agreement in the EFTA Court under Article 31 of
the Agreement Between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Survelliance Au-
thority and a Court of Justice ("SCA"). SCA, supra note 6, art. 31, O.J. L 344/1, at 5
(1994). The provision corresponds to Article 169 of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty, supra
note 8, art. 169, O.J. C 224/1, at 61 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686.
15. The President of the Norwegian Supreme Court, Carsten Smith, has rightly
stated that "when a national court has requested an opinion, that court would certainly
be rather reluctant to disregard that opinion." Carsten Smith, Case Law Harmonization,
in FESTSFRFr TILL STIG STRSMHOLM 795, 798 (1997).
16. See MAG Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, Case E-2/
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The request for a preliminary ruling concerned the ques-
tion of whether Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive re-
quires the EFTA States that are parties to the EEA Agreement to
observe the principle of EEA-wide exhaustion, or whether the
states in question retain the power to apply the principle of in-
ternational exhaustion in their national trademark laws. The
plaintiff in the proceedings before the Fredrikstad City Court
(Fredrikstad Byrett), Mag Instrument, Inc., was a U.S. company
that produces and sells the so-called Maglite lights. In Norway,
Viking International Products A/S, Oslo, was the authorized sole
importer and sole distributor for those products. The trademark
was registered in Norway in the plaintiff's name. The defendant,
California Trading Company Norway, Ulsteen, had imported
Maglite lights directly from the United States into Norway for
sale in Norway, without the consent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
brought proceedings against the defendant before the national
court, arguing that the imports infringed its exclusive trademark
rights.
C. Ruling
The EFTA Court held the oral hearing on November 11,
1997, and handed down its preliminary ruling on December 3,
1997.17 The court ruled that Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Di-
rective did not curtail the right of the EFTA States that are signa-
tories to the EEA Agreement to apply the principle of interna-
tional exhaustion of trademark rights. It relied principally on the
argument that:
[T]he principle of international exhaustion is in the interest
97, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 331, 337, 18. According to Article 65(2) of the EEA Agree-
ment, the provisions and arrangements concerning intellectual, industrial, and com-
mercial property contained in Protocol 28 and Annex XVII shall, unless otherwise spec-
ified, apply to all products and services. EEA Agreement, supra note 2, art. 65(2), O.J. L
1/3, at 18 (1994). Protocol 28 deals, inter alia, with the issue of exhaustion of rights.
Paragraph I of Article 2 states:
To the extent that exhaustion is dealt with in Community measures or juris-
prudence, the Contracting Parties shall provide for such exhaustion of intel-
lectual property rights as laid down in Community law. Without prejudice to
future developments of case law, this provision shall be interpreted in accord-
ance with the meaning established in the relevant rulings of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities given prior to the signature of the Agree-
ment.
Id., Protocol 28 on intellectual property, art. 2(1), OJ. L 1/3, at 194 (1994).
17. Maglite, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 331.
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of free trade and competition and thus in the interest of con-
sumers. Parallel imports from countries outside the Euro-
pean Economic Area lead to a greater supply of goods bear-
ing a trademark on the market. As a result of this situation,
price levels of products will be lower than in a market where
only importers authorized by the trademark holder distribute
their products.1
8
The court held, furthermore, that "the principle of international
exhaustion is in line with the main function of a trademark,
which is to allow the consumer to identify with certainty the ori-
gin of the products."19 Although the court, like the ECJ in its
judgment delivered a short time previously in Dior,2" acknowl-
edged the importance of protecting the goodwill of a trademark,
it ruled that the protection of goodwill was not of such impor-
tance as to require a ban on parallel imports.2'
The court was, however, aware of the fact that the parallel
Silhouette case was pending before the ECJ at that time. It also
knew that except for Sweden, all the EC Member States that had
intervened and the European Commission had urged the ECJ to
rule against international exhaustion. The EFTA Court's second
line of argument is to be seen in this light. The EF-FA Court
stressed the difference in purpose and scope between the EC
Treaty and the EEA Agreement. 22 In contrast with the EC Mem-
ber States, the EFTA States that are signatories to the EEA Agree-
ment have not transferred their autonomy in matters of foreign
trade to any supranational organ and unlike the EC Treaty, the
EEA Agreement does not establish a customs union. The EFTA
Court concluded from this observation that it is for the EFTA
States to decide whether to introduce or to maintain the princi-
ple of international exhaustion. The EFTA Court rejected the
argument put forward by the European Commission and the
governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom par-
ticipating in the proceedings before it, that if individual EF-TA
States belonging to the EEA were to allow international exhaus-
tion, then a situation could develop in which the same products
18. Id. at 337, 19.
19. Id. at 337, 20.
20. Parfums Christian SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v. Evora BV, Case C-337/
95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6013, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 737.
21. Maglite, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 337, 20.
22. Id. at 338-39, 25.
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might be subject to parallel imports into one state, but not into
another. It held that, according to Article 8 of the EEA Agree-
ment, the principle of the free movement of goods applies only
to goods originating in the EEA.23 Consequently, the U.S. Mag-
lite lights in issue were not subject to the rules on the free move-
ment of goods. The court finally pointed out that its interpreta-
tion of Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive is also in line
with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights24 ("TRIPs" Agreement) in which it is left open
for the Member States to regulate the issue.25 With this ruling,
the EFTA Court followed essentially the line proposed by the
Liechtenstein Government, the Norwegian Government, and
the EFTA Surveillance Authority.
II. ECJ'S POSITION IN SILHOUETTE. INTERNATIONAL
EXHAUSTION OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNAL MARKET
A. Facts and Procedure
On October 15, 1996, the Supreme Court (Oberste Gericht-
shoj) of the Republic of Austria referred, inter alia, the following
question to the ECJ:
Is Article 7(1) of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC
of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member
States relating to trademarks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1) to be inter-
preted as meaning that the trademark entitles its proprietor
to prohibit a third party from using the mark for goods which
have been put on the market under that mark in a State
which is not a Contracting State?26
The plaintiff in the proceedings before the national court, Sil-
houette International Schmied Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, pro-
23. Id. at 339, 26.
24. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M.
1197, in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Fi-
nal Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, Annex 1C [hereinafter TRIPs].
25. Maglite, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 339, 29.
26. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Silhouette International Schmied & Co.
KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799,-,
24, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953, 961. For the sake of completeness, it may be added that the
Austrian Supreme Court referred a second question to the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") that is, however, not of interest in the given context.
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duced spectacles in the higher price ranges in Austria and sold
them through authorized dealers. The plaintiff did not supply
goods to the defendant, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, be-
cause it did not accord with the Silhouette image. In October
1995, the plaintiff sold spectacles of an outdated model to a
company in Bulgaria. The goods were intended for sale in the
states of the former Soviet Union. The defendant managed to
acquire the entire shipment from the plaintiff's customer in So-
fia and placed the goods on the market in Austria. It announced
in a press campaign that, although it had not been supplied by
the plaintiff, it had succeeded in purchasing 21,000 out-of-fash-
ion Silhouette frames from abroad. Silhouette had directed its
representative to instruct the purchasers to sell the frames in
Bulgaria or the states of the former Soviet Union only, and not
to export them to other countries. In its action for an injunc-
tion, the plaintiff pleaded infringement of its trademark rights.
It maintained that, following the entry into force of Article 7 of
the Trade Mark Directive, worldwide exhaustion no longer ap-
plies. The oral hearing was held on October 14, 1997.
B. Opinion of the Advocate General
In his opinion of January 29, 1998, Advocate General Fran-
cisJacobs dealt in detail with the issues involved, such as the text,
the scheme, and the history of the Trade Mark Directive, the
functioning of the single market, competition and consumer
protection inside the European Union, free trade, and the doc-
trine of functions of trademarks.
In particular, the Advocate General stated that it was to be
inferred from the wording of the Trade Mark Directive, and
from the principle that derogations are to be construed nar-
rowly, that Article 7(1) was to be interpreted as precluding inter-
national exhaustion.27 The language of the provision, however,
was not conclusive. Those who favored international exhaustion
pointed to the limited nature of the harmonization attempted by
the Trade Mark Directive and argued that the intention of Arti-
cle 7 was simply to codify the relevant case law of the ECJ. He
went on to say that they contended that the ECJ itself had ruled
that Article 7 was to be interpreted in the same way as the ECJ's
case law on Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty. Consequently, it
27. Id. at -, 30-34, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 962-63.
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was argued, the Member States kept the right to decide in favor
of international exhaustion. On the other hand, the opponents
of international exhaustion, relying on the wording of the third
recital in the preamble to the Trade Mark Directive, 28 argued
that international exhaustion would most directly affect the
functioning of the internal market, and that this principle was
the type of issue that the Trade Mark Directive sought to harmo-
nize. Moreover, despite its limited scope, the purpose of the
Trade Mark Directive was to ensure that trademarks enjoy the
same protection under the legal systems of all the Member
States.
The Advocate General reasoned that, while it was true that
in an internal European Community context, the ECJ treated
Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive as codifying its previous
case law on Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty, it could not be
assumed that that was the sole function of Article 7.29 If the
Trade Mark Directive was seen as establishing the essential terms
and effects of trademark protection; then it would be difficult to
argue that it left Member States free to opt for international ex-
haustion. The scope of the exhaustion principle was after all
central to the content of trademark rights.
But even if one took a narrower view of the character of the
Trade Mark Directive, the Advocate General continued, it would
seem clear that the international exhaustion was one of the mat-
ters that would most directly affect the functioning of the inter-
nal market, and therefore become the matter that the Trade
Mark Directive would seek to harmonize. If some Member
States practiced international exhaustion while others did not,
then there would be barriers to trade within the internal market,
which was precisely the object of the Trade Mark Directive to
remove.3" The Advocate General stressed that it was, above all,
on that ground that the Austrian, French, German, Italian, and
United Kingdom Governments and the European Commission
28. The third recital in the preamble to the Trade Mark Directive reads as follows:
"Whereas it does not appear to be necessary at present to undertake full-scale approxi-
mation of the trademark laws of the Member States and it will be sufficient if approxi-
mation is limited to those national provisions of law which most directly affect the func-
tioning of the internal market." First Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC, supra note 2,
pmbl., O.J. L 40/1, at 1 (1989).
29. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Silhouette, [1998] E.C.R. at -, 39,
[1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 964.
30. Id. at , 41, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 964-65 (emphasis added).
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based their submission. He then referred to the fact that a simi-
lar argument had been advanced by France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom before the EFTA Court in Maglite. It was re-
jected by the EFTA Court with regard to the EFTA States, with
reference to the provisions of the EEA Agreement on the free
movement of goods.31 The Advocate General concluded, how-
ever, that the EFTA Court had not considered the question of
goods originating within the EEA, thereby distinguishing Silhou-
ette from Maglite on the facts as well as on the law.
The Advocate General went on to state that the Swedish
Government alone expressed the view that the Trade Mark Di-
rective left it up to the Member States to regulate the question of
international exhaustion. According to the Swedish position, it
is no part of the function of a trademark to enable the owner to
divide up the market and to exploit price differentials. The
adoption of international exhaustion would bring substantial ad-
vantages to consumers and would promote price competition.
The Advocate General argued, however, that the ECJ's case law
on the function of trademarks was developed in the context of
the Community, not world market. Such compelling considera-
tions did not apply to imports from third countries. On the con-
trary, to allow Member States to opt for international exhaustion
would itself result in barriers between Member States.3 2
The Advocate General conceded that, to some commenta-
tors, the exclusion of international exhaustion would appear
protectionist and therefore harmful. But he expressed concern
about the possible lack of reciprocity if the Community were unilat-
erally to provide for international exhaustion. In any event, it
was no part of the ECJ's function to seek to evaluate such policy
considerations.3 As regards price competition and the benefit to
consumers, such advantages were, in the view of the Advocate
General, to be set against the threat to the integrity of the inter-
nal market. That integrity would be severely prejudiced if one
Member State provided for international exhaustion while an-
other did not-only consumers in the first state would benefit
from the lower prices of imports from third countries.34
31. Id. at -, 43, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 966.
32. Id. at -, 50, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 967.
33. Id. at -, 51, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 967.
34. Id. at -, 52, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 967.
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Finally, the Advocate General stated that it was impossible to
contend that the Trademark Regulation conferred a discretion
on the Member States with regard to exhaustion.35 The ques-
tion then was whether identical provisions could be construed
differently. In view of the fact that in the case at hand the con-
text was exactly the same, the Advocate General concluded that
the regulation provided at least some further support for the
view that the Trade Mark Directive precluded international ex-
haustion.
C. Ruling
The ECJ held in its plenary judgment of July 16, 1998, that
national rules providing for exhaustion of trademark rights in
respect to products put on the market outside the EEA under
that mark by the owner or with its consent were contrary to Arti-
cle 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive. The court relied on the
classical canons of interpretation with the exception of the legis-
lative history, i.e., the wording of Article 7 and the scheme and
the purpose of the provisions concerning the rights that a trade-
mark confers on its owner.36 In doing so, the ECJ pointed out
that it was following the position taken by the Austrian, French,
German, Italian, and United Kingdom Governments and the Eu-
ropean Commission.37 The court first referred to Article 5(1) of
the Trade Mark Directive, according to which the registered
trademark confers on the proprietor exclusive rights therein.3"
It then stated that according to the text of Article 7 itself, "ex-
haustion occurs only where the products have been put on the
market in the Community (in the EEA since the EEA Agreement
entered into force)."39 The ECJ reasoned that the Trade Mark
Directive provided harmonization of "the rules concerning those
provisions of national law which most directly affect the func-
tioning of the internal market," and that the harmonization re-
35. Article 13(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on
the Community trademark states: "A Community trade mark shall not entitle the pro-
prietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the
Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent." Council
Regulation No. 40/94, OJ. L 11/1, at 6 (1991).
36. Silhouette International Schmied & Co. KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft
mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799, -, 22, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 976.
37. Id.
38. Id. at -, 17, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 975.
39. Id. at -, 18, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 975-76.
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lating to those rules is complete. 40 In this respect, the court re-
ferred to the first and ninth recital in the preamble of the Trade
Mark Directive, according to which disparities in the trademark
laws of the Member States may impede the free movement of
goods and of services and may distort competition within the
common market, so that it was necessary, in view of the establish-
ment and functioning of the internal market, to approximate
the laws of Member States and that in order to facilitate the free
movement of goods and services, it was to be ensured that regis-
tered trademarks enjoyed the same protection under the legal
systems of all the Member States:41
In the light of those recitals, Articles 5 to 7 of the Trade
Mark Directive must be construed as embodying a complete
harmonisation of the rules relating to the rights conferred by
a trademark. That interpretation, it may be added, is borne
out by the fact that Article 5 expressly leaves it open to the
Member States to maintain or introduce certain rules specifi-
cally defined by the Community legislator. Thus, in accord-
ance with Article 5(2), to which the ninth recital refers, the
Member States have the option to grant more extensive pro-
tection to trademarks with a reputation.42
The court then emphasized that this was the sole interpreta-
tion that would be fully capable of ensuring that the purpose of
the Trade Mark Directive, to safeguard the functioning of the
internal market, was achieved: "A situation in which some Mem-
ber States could provide for international exhaustion while
others provided for Community exhaustion only would inevita-
bly give rise to barriers to the free movement of goods and the
freedom to provide services."4"
The ECJ rejected the argument put forward by the Swedish
Government that because the Trade Mark Directive was adopted
on the basis of Article 100a of the EC Treaty, which governs the
approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the
functioning of the internal market, it could not regulate rela-
tions between the Member States and third countries:
Even if Article 100a of the Treaty were to be construed in
40. Id. at -, 23, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 976.
41. Id. at -, 24, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 976-77.
42. Id. at -, 25, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 977.
43. Id. at , 27, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 977.
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the sense argued for by the Swedish Government, the fact re-
mains that Article 7, as has been pointed out in this judg-
ment, is not intended to regulate relations between Member
States and non-member countries but to define the rights of
proprietors of trademarks in the Community.44
In its final statement, the ECJ pointed out that the Euro-
pean Community authorities could always extend the exhaustion
provided for by Article 7 to products put on the market in non-
member countries by entering into international agreements.
45
III. A LOOK BACK: THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION OF
TRADEMARK RIGHTS
A. Recognition of International Exhaustion by the German Supreme
Court (Reichsgericht and BundesgerichtshoJ)
The principle of international exhaustion of trademark
rights was recognized for the first time in Continental Europe by
the German Reichsgericht in 1902 in a case involving parallel im-
ports of wine.46 A French manufacturer produced wine and put
it into circulation under the registered marks "Vin Mariani" and
"Mariani Wein." The producer assigned as its exclusive distribu-
tor for Germany was a dealer domiciled in Berlin. The defend-
ant imported original wine bearing the original trademark from
France into Germany. The German Supreme Court dismissed
the action brought by the trademark owner and held that be-
cause the wine was put into circulation in France, the German
trademark right had been exhausted. The ruling was based on
the universality doctrine. According to this doctrine, the trade-
mark right is not limited to a certain territory. The law applica-
ble to the mark is the law of the state where the trademark
owner is located. Protection of the right in foreign countries is
only an extension of the domestic right.4 7 The Reichsgericht stuck
to the concept of international exhaustion even when it aban-
doned the universality doctrine in favor of the territoriality prin-
44. Id. at -, 29, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 977.
45. Id. at -, 1 30, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 977.
46. ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZMLSACHEN [RGZ] 50, 229 (F.R.G.).
47. For an analysis concerning the universality doctrine in European literature, see
JOSEF KOHLER, DAS REHT DES MARKENSCHUTZES at 190, 412, 446 (1884), and GER-ARD
RIELE, MARKENRECHT UND PARALLELIMPORT 19 (1968).
TRADEMARK LAW AND PARALLEL IMPORTS
ciple.4" The main reason for the German Supreme Court's case
law was that international exhaustion is in line with the main
function of a trademark, to communicate the origin of the goods
without there being a likelihood of confusion. On the other
hand, the law in the court's view did not support the assumption
that the trademark owner was entitled to restrict further distribu-
tion of the goods, particularly by imposing resale price mainte-
nance on dealers.49
The roots of international exhaustion are, however, older.
U.S. courts have pointed out that the first sale doctrine in trade-
mark law as well as in copyright law and in other areas of intel-
lectual property law "finds its origins in the common law aver-
sion to limiting the alienation of personal property. '50 In other
words, the rule's rationale is that after the first sale the policy
favoring an intellectual property monopoly "gives way to policies
disfavoring restraints of trade and limitations on the alienation
of personal property."5 1
After World War II, the Bundesgerichtshof not only continued
using the international exhaustion doctrine, but also extended it
to the furthest extent possible. The main function of a trade-
mark, the German Supreme Court held in Maja,52 consists in
indicating that the goods originate from the business of the
trademark owner. The interest of the trademark owner to regu-
late the distribution channels is, on the other hand, not part of
the trademark right. Otherwise, the trademark right would be a
vehicle to partition markets along state borders and accordingly,
to fix prices and distribution channels.
In Cinzano,5 3 a test case initiated by opponents of interna-
tional exhaustion, the German Supreme Court ruled that the
trademark was exhausted although the parallel imports were ma-
terially different from the goods sold by the official distributor.
48. RGZ 118, 76, (80).
49. RGZ 50, 229 (230).
50. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PIN) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d
Cir. 1988).
51. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C. & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1388
(C.D. Cal. 1993) (concerning copyright case).
52. ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZviLSACHEN [BGHZ] 41, 84
(91) (F.R.G.).
53. Cinzano & Co. GmbH v. Java Kaffeegeschaffe GmbH & Co., Judgment of Feb.
2, 1973, Fed. Sup. Ct. (F.R.G.), reprinted in 4 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
[IIC] 432 (1973).
1999]
660 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:645
The German subsidiary of Cinzano Italy had sold Cinzano ver-
mouth under the trademark "Cinzano" in Germany. The ver-
mouth was produced by Cinzano Italy and bottled and sold by
Cinzano's German subsidiary. The defendant purchased
Cinzano vermouth that was produced and bottled by the Spanish
subsidiary and the French licensee of Cinzano Italy. The labels
were slightly different from the ones affixed on the Italian bot-
tles. In Spain and France, local wines were used in producing
Cinzano, and the product was adapted to local taste. The Span-
ish and French vermouth therefore contained different ingredi-
ents than the Italian product. The court noted that at least a
connoisseur would probably be able to recognize the differences
in taste. All three distributors involved derived their right to use
the Cinzano mark from the Italian parent company. The court
concluded that the conduct of the Spanish and French compa-
nies was to be assigned to the German company. It denied a risk
of confusion, stating that the bands around the bottle necks de-
clared the parallel imports as "Spanish" and "French" vermouth.
The court further held that the territoriality principle meant
only that foreign trademarks could not be infringed upon by do-
mestic conduct and that domestic trademarks could not be in-
fringed upon by foreign. conduct, and no that measures taken
abroad should not have an influence on domestic trademarks.
The German Supreme Court confirmed its case law in Aqua
King.54 In this case, swimming pool vacuums manufactured in
the United States were imported into Germany from France.
The products sold by the official German dealer were of the
same origin. They were, however, assembled in Germany and
were therefore equipped with a stronger electric motor. The of-
ficial German dealer was not a subsidiary of the U.S. manufac-
turer. The court held that it was for the official German dealer
to inform the public of the material differences between the U.S.
original and the German version of the product.55
B. Other European Supreme Courts Follow the German Example
1. Swiss Federal Supreme Court
Under the old Swiss Trademark Act of 1891, the case law of
54. BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [BGH] GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT
[GRUR] 1983, 177.
55. BGH GRUR 1983, 179.
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the Swiss Federal Supreme Court was rather inconsistent. 6 In its
1979 Omo judgment,17 the court held, however, that a Swiss
trademark owner was prevented from banning the import of
goods if the goods were manufactured within one and the same
concern. Under such circumstances there would be no confu-
sion if Swiss consumers identified the trademark not only with
the Swiss subsidiary, but also with any company belonging to the
same concern. In its ruling, the court stopped short of recogniz-
ing the principle of international exhaustion. The result was ba-
sically the same.
The court held, however, that in case of material differences
that create a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of goods,
the trademark owner is entitled to prohibit the import. In the
case at hand, the court found such differences in that the Omo
detergent sold by the official Swiss distributor, unlike the deter-
gent imported by the unauthorized dealer, contained blue need-
les, smelled different, and was milder on cloth. The exclusively
male court held that Swiss housewives did indeed care about
such differences.5" Likelihood of confusion was thus deemed to
be established, and the Swiss trademark holder was granted the
right to block the parallel imports. One will notice that in this
respect the Swiss Supreme Court's approach differed signifi-
cantly from the one taken by its German counterpart in Cinzano
and Acqua King.59
2. Austrian Supreme Court
The Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster GerichtshoJ) originally
ruled against international exhaustion.60 It changed its practice
in 1971 in AGFA.61 The German AGFA Gevaert AG was the pro-
prietor of the trademark AGFA, which had been registered for
unexposed films. The sole distributor for Austria was AGFA's
Austrian subsidiary, which had been licensed the trademark. A
56. In Lux, BUNDESGERICHTS ENTSCHEIDUNGEN [BGE] 78 11 164, the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court ruled against international exhaustion, however, in Philips, BGE 86 II
270, the court ruled in favor of international exhaustion.
57. BGE 105 II 49.
58. BGE 105 II 56.
59. BGH GRUR 1983, 177.
60. Nescafi, 1955 OSTERREICHISCHE BLATrER FOR GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT [OBL) 67 (Aus.); Brunswick, 1957 0BL 87; Seeburg, 1960 GEWERBUCHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT.] 557 (Aus.).
61. 1974 OBL 84, 1971 GRUR INT. 90.
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parallel importer purchased original AGFA products bearing the
original trademark in Germany and sold them in Austria. The
first instance court ruled in favor of the Austrian AGFA licensee,
referring to the existing case law of the Austrian Supreme Court.
The Austrian Court of Appeals held that the goods in question
came from the same concern and were identical to those mar-
keted by the official dealer. Additionally, the Austrian Court of
Appeals referred to the Maja ruling of the German Federal
Supreme Court62 and to the Philips decision of the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court63 and reversed the decision of the first instance
court. The Austrian Supreme Court found it necessary once
again to examine the question of whether so-called parallel im-
ports amounted to an infringement of domestic trademarks and
noted that important industrialized countries together with the
German and the Swiss federal supreme courts answered this
question in the negative. 64 Based on considerations similar to
those examined by these two courts, the Austrian Supreme
Court came to the conclusion that the parallel imports were in
line with the function of origin of trademarks and confirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 65 The Austrian Supreme
Court confirmed its judgment in Lanvin66 and Spinnrad.67
3. Other European Courts
The principle of international exhaustion was furthermore
applied by the Dutch,68 the Swedish, 69 and the Finnish courts70
in cases of identical product quality. The courts in the United
Kingdom recognized the doctrine in cases of common control, 71
but tended to define the material differences standard relatively
narrowly.7 2 Sweden stuck to the exhaustion principle even after
its entry into the European Union. 3 On the other hand, inter-
62. BGHZ 41, 84 (91).
63. BGE 86 II 270.
64. 1974 OBL 84, 1971 GRUR INT. 90.
65. Id.
66. 1984 OBL 24, 1984 GRUR INT. 369.
67. 1991 OBL 257, 1992 GRUR INT. 467.
68. See Grundig, 1973 GRUR INT. 562 (Neth.).
69. See Polycolor, 1967 NYrTJURIDISKT ARKiv 458 (Swed.)
70. See Mobil, 1994 GRUR INT. 432 (Fin.); Adidas, 1994 GRUR INT. 433 (Fin.).
71. See Revlon, 1980 GRUR INT. 234, 236 (U.K.).
72. Colgate, 1989 GRUR INT. 320; Colgate II, 1991 GRUR INT. 50 (U.K.).
73. See Johannes Christian Wichard, Weltweite oder europaweite Ersch6pfung von
Markenrechten?, 1997 GRUR INT. 711.
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national exhaustion was not recognized by Italian,"4 French,75
and Greek76 courts.
C. Case Law of the ECJ Under Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty:
Member States May Opt for International Exhaustion
In EC law, before the enactment of the Trade Mark Direc-
tive, the exhaustion issue had been dealt with under Articles 30
and 36 of the EC Treaty. According to Article 30 of the EC
Treaty, measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restric-
tions on imports are prohibited between the Member States. Ar-
ticle 36 of the EC Treaty states, however, that the provision does
not preclude prohibitions or restrictions justified on grounds of,
inter alia, "the protection of industrial and commercial prop-
erty." Such a prohibition or restriction shall not, however, con-
stitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion on trade between the Member States.
According to the case law of the ECJ, the owner of a trade-
mark protected by the legislation of a Member State cannot rely
on that legislation to prevent the import or marketing of a prod-
uct that was put on the market in another Member State by the
owner or with its consent.77 In these circumstances, "the owner's
exclusive right to affix a trademark to a product must be re-
garded as exhausted in order to allow an importer to market
under that trademark products which were put on the market in
another Member State by the owner or with his consent."78
From a current perspective, the ECJ's case law could hardly be
considered revolutionary. The ECJ's approach is a logical conse-
quence of the fact that the territory of the Community forms a
uniform economic and legal area.79
74. Brauns, 1965 GRUR INT. 377 (Italy).
75. Guerlian II, 1988 GRUR INr. 687 (Fr.).
76. Roadstar, 1991 GRUR INT. 739 (Greece).
77. Centrafarm v. Winthrop, Case 16/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, 1194-95, 7-11,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480, 508-09; EMI Records v. CBS United Kingdom Limited, Case 15/
75, [1976] E.C.R. 811, 845, 10, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 235, 265; Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin
Record Shops, Case 270/80, [1982] E.C.R. 329, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 677; IHT Interna-
tional Heiztechnik v. Ideal Standard, Case C-9/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, 1-2846, 33,
[1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857, 870.
78. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova, Cases C-427, 429, & 436/93, [1996] E.C.R. I-
3457, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1151.
79. See Ulrich Loewenheim, Nationale und internationale Erschdpfung von Schut-
zrechten im Wandel der Zeiten, 1996 GRUR INT. 307, 31.0.
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Member States were therefore prevented from using the
principle of (only) national exhaustion of trademark rights. Re-
gional exhaustion was the minimal standard. It was, however,
common ground that the case law did not require those Member
States that had opted for the principle of international exhaus-
tion to give up that principle. In fact, as the EFTA Court
pointed out in Maglite, "some Member States in the Community
and in EFTA either retained international exhaustion or left the
question open for interpretation by the national courts."80
D. Abandonment of International Exhaustion by the German Federal
Supreme Court
The phalanx of those EC Member States that had adopted
the principle of international exhaustion was initially broken up
by the judgment of the German Federal Supreme Court in Dyed
Jeans (GefdrbteJeans).s5 The German legislature implemented Ar-
ticle 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive by copying it word for
word in Section 24(1) of the 1994 Trademark Act (Markengesetz).
The German Federal Supreme Court ruled that trademark
rights will now be exhausted only if the parallel imports have
been put into circulation in the EEA under the trademark by the
trademark owner or with its consent, but not if the goods have
been put on the market anywhere else in the world by the trade-
mark owner or with its consent. It stated that, indeed, the legis-
lature had abandoned the principle of international exhaustion
in Section 24(1) of the Trademark Act corresponding to the
binding provision of Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive. The
court noted that it was not its task to consider whether this re-
stricted exhaustion rule was contrary to the promotion of inter-
national free trade and that the European Union had the com-
petence to conclude with important trading partners agree-
ments providing for the application of international exhaustion.
Dyed Jeans is a noteworthy judgment for two other reasons.
On the one hand, the German Federal Supreme Court decided
the case without making reference to the ECJ although it should
have done so under Article 177(3) of the EC Treaty. 2 One will
80. MAG Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, Case E-2/97,
1997 Rep. EFTA Ct. 127, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 331, 338, 23.
81. Dyed Jeans, 1996 GRUR INT. 721 (F.R.G.).
82. None of the so-called CILFIT-exceptions applied in the case. The question is
not relevant to the outcome of the case, and previous decisions of the ECJ have already
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notice that the Austrian Supreme Court asked the ECJ for pre-
liminary rulings when it was confronted with the same question
in Silhouette and Wrangler.3 On the other hand, Dyed Jeans was
not about imports of original goods bearing the original trade-
mark. The defendant had sold "Levi's 501" jeans that had been
produced in the United States by the plaintiff, which owned the
German trademark. Thejeans had, however, been bleached and
dyed before being imported to Germany, with some of them
made into shorts, all without the plaintiff's consent. In the de-
fendant's store there was a sign reading, "Used Levi's 501 origi-
nal USA . . . these second-hand jeans were not dyed by Levi
Strauss." It has rightly been said that in view of these facts, Dyed
Jeans was basically not an exhaustion case, but a simple trade-
mark infringement case."4 The German Court of Appeals, which
had based its judgment on the theory of international exhaus-
tion, had ruled accordingly.8 5 With its judgment in Dyed Jeans,
the Federal Supreme Court that so far had been the bulwark
against attempts to bring down the principle of international ex-
haustion had set the ball rolling.
IV. COMMENTS
A. General Remarks
1. Arguments of the ECJ in Silhouette
Compared to the previous situation, the ECJ's Silhouette rul-
ing has led to a considerable restriction of international inter-
brand trade in those EC Member States that formerly adhered to
the principle of international exhaustion. The judgment is
based on two lines of argument: first, the ECJ used classical ca-
nons of statutory interpretation, emphasizing in particular that
the limitation to regional exhaustion was in line with the text of
Article 7(1), the scope of Article 5, and the recitals of the Trade
Mark Directive concerning the function of trademark law har-
dealt with the point of law. The correct interpretation is so obvious that there is no
scope for any reasonable doubt- See CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, Case 283/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 3415, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472.
83. Wrangler Germany GmbH v. Metro Selbstbedienungs-Grosshandel GmbH
Case C-278/97 (pending case). The request in Wrangler was withdrawn after the hand-
ing down of the Silhouette judgment.
84. See Hanns Ullrich, Anmerkung (Comment), 89 MITrEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN
PATENTANWALTE 190 n.8 (1998).
85. Dyed Jeans, 1996 GRUR INT. 721, 726-27.
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monization to facilitate the free movement of goods and serv-
ices; and second, the ECJ relied upon the policy argument that
the result found was the only one that was in line with the goal of
securing the functioning of the internal market.
2. Other Issues Involved
It may also be noted that in the judgment there is no discus-
sion by the ECJ of the other policy issues involved. The reason
that the ECJ, in Silhouette, did not address questions such as the
impact of its decision on competition and free trade could be
that such a discussion would possibly lent support to those who
think that trademarks should serve as tools to partition markets
along national lines. The approach chosen by the ECJ is, never-
theless, not in line with modern methodology of the law, accord-
ing to which judges and courts ought to state the value judg-
ments underlying their decisions openly.86 One will notice in
this context that both the EFFA Court in Maglite and the Advo-
cate General in Silhouette openly discussed the impacts of a rule
favoring or disfavoring parallel imports on competition, con-
sumer interests, and free trade. It has furthermore been noted
that the ECJ did not even elaborate on what kind of restriction
of free movement of goods and services would have occurred
had it opted for a solution that would have left the Member
States the right to grant international exhaustion.8" One will fi-
nally notice that the ECJ has not mentioned at all the question
of the compatibility of its ruling with TRIPs and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").88
It has been regretted in scholarly literature that the ECJ did
not take into account the EFTA Court's Maglite precedent.89 In
fact, the ECJ is under no explicit obligation to pay due account
to EFTA Court decisions. One may, however, assume that such
an incumbency follows from the spirit of the EEA Agreement, in
86. See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, TEX. INT'L
L.J. (forthcoming Spring 1999).
87. See Michael Beckmann, Die Reichweite des Erschdpfungsgrunsatzes nach neuem
Markenrecht, 1998 GRUR INT. 836, 839.
88. The author discusses TRIPs and GATT compatibility in Part IV, Section D of
this Article.
89. See Gallus Joller, Zur territorialen Reichweite des Erschtpfungsgrundsatzes im
Markenrecht, 47 GRUR INT. 751, 759 (1998); see also Udo von Fragstein, Europaweite Er-
schbpfung von Markenrechten, 9 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR EUROPAISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS-UND STEUER-
RECHT 405, 407 (1998).
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particular from its overall goal of securing a homogeneous devel-
opment of the law in the EEA.90
3. Consequences for Competition and Consumers
On the merits, the ECJ has been criticized for its Silhouette
ruling. The main line of argument is that the ECJ has in fact
increased the protection of trademark owners' interests at the
expense of consumers. Such strengthening of monopolies, the
critics contend, amounts to lessening competition and will
thereby lead to higher prices. It also leads to reverse discrimina-
tion of European consumers compared to consumers in third
countries. 91 It is not without a certain undertone of sadness that
Advocate General Jacobs admitted in his opinion that he found
the arguments related to the consequences on consumers and
competition put forward by the Swedish Government "extremely
attractive. '92  The same arguments, among others, have
prompted the EFTA Court to conclude that Article 7(1) of the
Trade Mark Directive does not prevent EFTA/EEA States from
maintaining or introducing international exhaustion of trade-
mark rights.9"
One will not overlook in this context that the ECJ itself has,
for instance, dealt with some of the issues in question in its ear-
lier case law on normal trademark infringement, i.e., in cases
involving goods of another manufacturer. This fact holds true
first of all for the case law under Articles 30 and 36 of the EC
Treaty. In Ideal Standard, the ECJ ruled that the essential func-
tion of a trademark is to ensure that consumers are able "to
identify for certain the origin of the marked goods and the pro-
prietor of the trademark could be held responsible for the poor
quality of goods for which he was in no way accountable."94 In
90. See Carl Baudenbacher, VierJahre EFFA-Gerichtshof, 9 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 391, 397 (1998).
91. See Loewenheim, supra note 79, at 190; Cornish, supra note 3, at 172; Frederick
Abbott, Discussion Paper for Conference on Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights
and Parallel Importation in World Trade, Geneva, Nov. 6-7, 1998, passim [hereinafter
Discussion Paper for Conference].
92. Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Silhouette International Schmied Gesell-
schaft mbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 14799, -, 49, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 953, 967.
93. MAG Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, Case E-2/97,
1997 Rep. EFTA Ct. 127, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 331, 339, 1 27-28.
94. IHT International Heiztechnik v. Ideal Standard, C-9/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2789,
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Bristol-Myers Squibb, the ECJ stated that in a system of undistorted
competition:
undertakings must be able to attract and retain customers by
the quality of their products or services, which is possible only
thanks to the existence of distinctive signs allowing them to
be identified. For the trademark to be able to fulfil that func-
tion, it must constitute a guarantee that all products which
bear it have been manufactured under the control of a single
undertaking to which responsibility for their quality may be
attributed.9 5
The function of origin has furthermore been the main topic
in the case law under the Trade Mark Directive before Silhou-
ette,96 and the ECJ has continued this line of argument in its first
decision involving goods of another producer after Silhouette.97
It emphasized that under the tenth recital in the preamble to
the Trade Mark Directive, "the function of the protection con-
ferred by the mark is primarily to guarantee the indication of
origin" and that according to the settled case law of the ECJ, the
essential function of the trademark is to guarantee the identity
of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end user
by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distin-
guish the product or service from others that have another ori-
gin. For the trademark to be able to fulfill its essential role in
the system of undistorted competition, which the EC Treaty
seeks to establish, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or
services bearing it have originated under the control of a single
undertaking that is responsible for their quality.98 Based on
these considerations, the court held that there is a correlation
between the similarity of the goods in the meaning of Article
4(1) (b) of the Trade Mark Directive, on the one hand, and the
1-2850-51, 45, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857, 910; see SA CNL-SOCAL NV v. HAG GF AG,
Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, 1-3759, 16, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571, 608 [hereinaf-
ter HAG II].
95. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova, Cases C-427, 429, & 436/93, [1996] E.C.R. I-
3457, 1-3531, 43, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1151, 1212.
96. See generally Phytheron Int'l SA v. Jean Bourdon SA, Case C-352/95, [1997]
E.C.R. 1-1729, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 199; Sabel BV v. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport, Case
C-251/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445; Loendersloot v. Ballantine &
Son Ltd., Case C-349/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6227, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 1015.
97. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Case C-39/97 (ECJ
Sept. 29, 1998) (not yet reported).
98. HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3730, 13-14, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 581 (speaking
of doctrine of common origin).
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degree of similarity of the respective signs and the distinctive
character of the mark to be protected, on the other.
4. Defining Rights of Trademark Owners vs. Regulating Third
Country Relations
The argument that Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive is
meant not to regulate relations between Member States and
non-member countries, but to define the rights of trademarks
owners in the European Community,99 is only half true. In fact,
the provision does, in the interpretation given by the ECJ,
both-defining the rights of the proprietors and regulating rela-
tions with third countries.
The ECJ has used a similar argument in its Javico judgment
of April 28, 1998, on Article 85 of the EC Treaty."°° In that case,
the court held that provisions in an agreement between a French
perfume manufacturer (Yves Saint Laurent) and a German
dealer (Javico) containing an obligation to export luxury cos-
metics to non-member countries (Russia, Ukraine, and Slovenia)
and a prohibition of reimporting and marketing those products
into the Community did not, by their very nature, have, as their
objective the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition
within the common market in the meaning of Article 85(1) of
the EC Treaty. Stipulations of the type in question had to be
construed:
not as being intended to exclude parallel imports and mar-
keting of the contractual product within the Community but
as being designed to enable the producer to penetrate a mar-
ket outside the Community by supplying a sufficient quantity
of contractual products to that market. That interpretation is
supported by the fact that, in the agreements at issue, the pro-
hibition of selling outside the contractual territory also covers
all other non-member countries. It follows that an agreement
in which the reseller gives to the producer an undertaking
that he will sell the contractual products on a market outside
the Community cannot be regarded as having the objective of
appreciably restricting competition within the common mar-
ket or as being capable of affecting, as such, trade between
99. Id. at 1-3737, 29, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 589.
100. Javico Int'l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, Case C-306/96,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-1983, [19981 5 C.M.L.R. 172.
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Member States."' l
A provision, therefore, was prohibited under Article 85(1)
of the EC Treaty only if it had the effect of preventing, restricting,
or distorting competition within the Community and was liable
to affect the pattern of trade between Member States.
In that regard, the court held that it had to be determined
"whether the structure of the Community market in the relevant
products is oligopolistic, allowing only limited competition
within the Community network for the distribution of those
products," 102 and:
whether there is an appreciable difference between the prices
of the contractual products charged in the Community and
those charged outside the Community. Such a difference is
not, however, liable to affect competition if it is eroded by the
level of customs duties and transport costs resulting from the
export of the product to a non-member country followed by
its re-import into the Community.
10 3
If that examination were to disclose that the contested provisions
had the effect of undermining competition within the meaning
of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty, it would also be necessary to deter-
mine whether they:
entail any risk of an appreciable effect on the pattern of trade
between the Member States such as to undermine attainment
of the objectives of the common market. In that regard, in-
tra-Community trade cannot be appreciably affected if the
products intended for markets outside the Community ac-
count for only a very small percentage of the total market for
those products in the territory of the common market. 10 4
Whether these conditions were in fact fulfilled for the agree-
ments to be covered by Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty, the ECJ
concluded, was for the national court to determine. 10 5
Advocate General Giuseppe Tesauro had taken the view
that Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty was applicable and that it
prohibited the contractual terms at issue. These terms sought to
achieve an aim that was manifestly anticompetitive, and they
101. Id. at 1-2004, 19-20, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. at 190.
102. Id. at 1-2005, 23, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. at 191.
103. Id. at 1-2005, 24, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. at 191.
104. Id. at 1-2005, 1 25-26, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. at 191.
105. Id. at 1-2006, 27, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. at 191-92.
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were fundamentally incompatible with Article 85(1).1°6 In view
of the low prices prevailing on the markets of the non-member
countries, the Advocate General considered, the possibility
could not be excluded that goods might be reimported into a
Member State and then imported into another Member State.
That would, indeed, affect trade between the Member States.
In fact, the agreements between Yves Saint Laurent and
Javico were aimed at achieving both goals: to encourage market
penetration outside the Community on the one hand and to ex-
clude parallel imports into the Community on the other. In any
case, the plaintiff before the national court (the party pleading a
restraint of competition or a restraint of free trade in the ECJ's
diction) will normally not have the resources to prove the effects
of certain clauses in a distribution agreement on competition.
The national court will therefore hardly be in a situation to ex-
amine and determine those effects. It seems that only the Euro-
pean Commission would be in a position to carry out this task. 107
The same holds true of the ECJ's Silhouette judgment-limiting
exhaustion to the territory of the EEA facilitates the functioning
of the internal market and regulating relations with third coun-
tries.
5. Function of Origin vs. Goodwill Function
One of the goals of the European trademark law harmoniza-
tion is to strengthen the legal position of the trademark proprie-
tor. °8 Under Article 5(2) of the Trade Mark Directive, the
Member States have the option to grant. more extensive protec-
tion to trademarks with a reputation, although they are not
under an obligation to do so. Additionally, according to Article
17 of the EC Trademark Regulation, a "Community mark may
be transferred separately from any transfer of the undertak-
ing."t°9 In the light of this, some have argued that Silhouette ex-
106. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Javico Int'l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint
Laurent Parfums SA, Case C-306/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1983, 1-1986, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R.
172, 177.
107. It is furthermore doubtful as to whether an anti-competitive effect will occur
only in case of an oligopoly.
108. See Loewenheim, supra note 79, at 314.
109. Council Regulation No. 40/94, O.J. L 11/1, at 7 (1993). For the sake of com-
pleteness, one may add that the conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement and Chapter 17 of
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") have furthermore contributed
to the strengthening of the position of the trademark holder.
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presses a new approach with regard to the protection of goodwill
embodied in a trademark. 110
Some observations in the ECJ's Diorjudgment1 1 ' seem in-
deed to point in that direction. In this case, the court stressed
the importance of protecting the goodwill of a trademark with-
out defining the relationship of the goodwill function to the
function of origin. In Silhouette, however, the ECJ did not men-
tion the goodwill function at all. The same holds true of the first
judgment concerning a classical trademark law conflict after Sil-
houette in Canon.t 12 It is in fact questionable to deduce from the
strengthening of the goodwill function through the enactment
of the Trade Mark Directive and the EC Trademark Regulation,
that a policy limiting exhaustion to the national and regional
level must be permitted. The opposite view could be taken as
well: because the said developments have shifted the balance to-
wards the protection of the trademark holder, there are fewer
reasons for the assumption of (only) national and regional ex-
haustion than before they occurred.
On balance, there is now a split in the case law of the ECJ
with regard to the function of origin. As far as conflicts between
trademark owners and other economic operators using the same
or a similar trademark inside the EEA are concerned, the ECJ
follows the traditional doctrine. Its case law is based on the func-
tion of origin; it aims at facilitating parallel imports and thereby
at securing intrabrand competition. In the end, the interests of
consumers play the decisive role. For the sake of completeness,
it has to be mentioned that with regard to the situation inside
the EEA, the protection of intrabrand competition has also con-
tinued to be the dominating issue in patent law and in copyright
law.'1 3 In cases involving parallel imports of original goods bear-
110. von Fragstein, supra note 89, at 407 (speaking of rewarding function of
mark); Johannes Christian Wichard, Weltweite oder europaweite Erschdpfung von
Markenrechten?, 99 GRUR INT. 711, 713 (1997); see also Martin Huff, A victoly for intellec-
tual property, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, July 17, 1998, at 34.
111. Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v. Evora BV, Case
C-337/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6013, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 737.
112. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Case C-39/97 (ECJ
Sept. 29, 1998) (not yet reported).
113. See Merck v. Primecrown, Cases C-267-68/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-6285, [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 83 (concerning patent law) [hereinafter Merck I]; Generics BV v. Smith
Kline & French Laboratories Ltd., Case C-316/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3929 (concerning
infringment of pharmaceutical patent rights); Norwegian Government v. Astra Norge
AS, E-1/98, Judgment of Nov. 24, 1998, EFTA Court (not yet reported) (concerning
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ing the original trademark from outside of the EEA, the func-
tion of origin is on the other hand not referred to. In these
circumstances, the dominant function of the trademark is in-
deed the goodwill function.
B. Economic Considerations
Those who advocate the rules of restricting parallel imports
argue that international price discrimination may enhance global
welfare. The theory of international price discrimination con-
templates further that the producer in the country or region of
protection will be exposed to interbrand competition. 14 A simi-
lar approach has been advocated by the Chicago School of Anti-
trust with regard to vertical restraints on competition and in par-
ticular to resale price maintenance. Its representatives main-
tained that all vertical restraints should be lawful."1 5 They are of
the opinion that restrictions of intrabrand competition will en-
hance the more important interbrand competition."16 In the
1970s and 1980s, the Chicago School sought to convince the
U.S. Supreme Court that producers should (in the national con-
text) be allowed to enter freely into dealership agreements con-
taining vertical restraints on competition. These attempts were,
however, only partially successful. In Sylvania, the U.S. Supreme
Court held indeed that territorial restrictions are to be dealt with
not under the per se rule, but under the rule of reason. 117 On
the other hand, the court maintained its case law from 1911,11
according to which vertical agreements on resale prices are ille-
gal per se. 19
An open policy on parallel imports of trademarked goods is
based on the theory of comparative advantage. According to this
copyright). In the latter case, the EFTA Court held that an official dealer may not rely
on a national copyright in a summary of product characteristics for a pharmaceutical in
order to restrict parallel imports as this would amount to a disguised restriction on
trade between the Contracting Parties. The Court has thereby, for the first time, ruled
that there can be situations in which the subject matter of an intellectual property right is
to be set aside.
114. See von Fragstein, supra note 89, at 407.
115. See generally ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 303, 406 (1978).
116. Id. at 303; see RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
171, (1976).
117. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
118. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
119. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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theory, a liberal approach in international trade results in na-
tions specializing in the production of those goods in which they
are comparatively the most efficient. Such specialization is apt
to enhance global productivity and to benefit all the participants
in the world market.1 20 The theory operates on the basis of
price.
Each nation produces goods and services whose domestic
price reflects the cost of its various factors of production. If
the price of a good in one market is less than the price of the
same good in another market, traders will move goods from
the lower priced market to the higher priced market. Produ-
cers in the lower priced market will shift away from compara-
tively less efficient areas of production and into more effi-
cient and competitive areas of production, and national and
global productivity will increase.' 2 1
Rules restricting parallel imports are apt to frustrate those bene-
fits.
The decisive point seems to be that the assumption that the
restriction of intrabrand competition will always lead to in-
creased interbrand competition, so that the interests of the con-
sumers correspond, as a rule, to the interests of the producers,
cannot be maintained. It has been rightly said that:
when producers in national and regional markets are insu-
lated from external competition (i.e., insulated from im-
ports), the risks of collusive pricing strategies and the toler-
ance of economic efficiencies are substantially heightened.
There are significant risks that groups of producers who sell
in single markets will agree to restrict output and maintain
prices above market-efficient prices so as collectively to secure
non-market rates of return. By opening national and re-
gional markets to trade, governments substantially reduce the
risks posed by imperfect national and regional market struc-
tures. 1
2 2
120. Discussion Paper for Conference, supra note 91, at 9.
121. See id. (referring to Alan 0. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative
Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 49 (1998)).
122. Id. at 11.
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C. EC Relations with Third Countries
1. Preliminary Remarks
Commentators have pointed out that from the European
Commission's perspective, the limitation to only regional ex-
haustion represents a tool that will allow the European Union to
negotiate reciprocity agreements with its major trading part-
ners.12 The Advocate General in Silhouette has basically taken
the same view, 12 and the ECJ has (like the German Federal
Supreme Court in Dyed Jeans125 ) expressly mentioned this possi-
bility.1 2
6
The question then arises as to how the European Union's
major trading partners do in fact deal with the issue of interna-
tional exhaustion. The following considerations are aimed at ex-
amining the present legal situation in the United States and in
Japan, the two countries that, together with the European
United, form the so-called triade, and in Switzerland, the Euro-
pean Union's most important trading partner in Europe.
2. United States
a. Copyright Law
As far as the EU-U.S. relationship is concerned, it seems at
first sight that the ECJ in Silhouette has unilaterally taken back
elements of free trade although the U.S. Supreme Court has re-
cently (on March 9, 1998, i.e., between the delivery of the opin-
ion of the Advocate General and the handing down of the judg-
ment in Silhouette) signalled its willingness to take a liberal stand
on the matter in a copyright case.1 27 L'anza, a California manufac-
turer, sold its hair care products in the United States exclusively
to distributors who agreed to resell them within limited geo-
graphic areas and only to authorized retailers. After L'anza's
U.K. distributor arranged for the sale of several tons of L'anza
products, affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor in
123. See Karl-Heinz Fezer, Grundprinzipien und Entwicklungslinien im eurapiiischen
und internationalen Markenrecht, 44 WETrBEWERB IN RECHT UND PRAXis 1, 10 (1998);Jol-
ler, supra note 89, at 760.
124. Silhouette International Schmied Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953.
125. Dyed Jeans, 1996 GRUR INT. 721 (F.R.G.).
126. See supra footnote 45.
127. Quality King Distributors v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125
(1998).
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Malta, that distributor sold the goods to Quality King, which im-
ported them back into the United States without L'anza's per-
mission and then resold them at discounted prices to unauthor-
ized retailers. L'anza filed suit, alleging that the petitioner's ac-
tions violated L'anza's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act
of 1976128 to reproduce and to distribute the copyrighted mate-
rial in the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
held that the first sale doctrine was applicable to imported
nonpiratical (i.e., lawfully made) copies. The U.S. Supreme
Court rested its conclusion on the basis of statutory interpreta-
tion of the relevant provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act.129
Prior to this decision, copyright was frequently used to prevent
parallel imports into the United States. Indeed, in L'anza Re-
search International, Inc. v. Quality King Distributors, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Copyright Act's first sale
doctrine did not apply when the first sale took place abroad. To
hold otherwise would undermine the copyright holder's right to
control the distribution, including price, and quantity of copies,
and therefore deprive the copyright owner of the "full value" for
the copies sold to the foreign distributor.1 3 0
It has been remarked that in its ruling, the U.S. Supreme
Court has given a sign in favor of free trade and that it has prob-
ably delayed the ECJ's judgment in Silhouette. 31  The signifi-
cance of L'anza Research International is, however, not entirely
clear for at least three reasons. First, the case was not about
trademarks, but about copyright, though it certainly was an atypi-
cal copyright case. 132 It is nevertheless an open question how
the U.S. Supreme Court would have construed the first sale doc-
128. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501, 602 (1994).
129. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109(a), 602(a), 602(b).
130. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distributors, 98 F.3d 1109, 1116
(1996).
131. GallusJoller, U.S. Supreme Court fiir internationale Erschtpfung des Urheberrechts, 7
EUR. L. REP. 142, 143 (1998).
132. In the oral argument, one of the Justices stated in reaction to an assertion of
the Deputy Solicitor General who acted as an amicus curiae for the respondent that
"the whole point of copyright is to give incentives to create copyrighted works and to
protect... the ability of the authors to market them: 'We're talking about shampoo
here, aren't we?'." Oral Argument on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae,
supporting the Respondent at 32, 37, L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distrib-
utors, 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1470).
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trine in a trademark case.133 Second, Justice Ginsburg delivered
an uncontested concurring opinion stating that the case "in-
volves a 'round trip' journey, travel of the copies in question
from the United States to places abroad, then back again. Ijoin
the Court's opinion recognizing that we do not today resolve
cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were manufac-
tured abroad." Whether the court would apply the first sale doc-
trine in a case involving parallel imports of goods produced
outside the United States is therefore open.' 3 4 Third, even the
majority stressed that if the U.S. copyright holder divided the
copyright by giving the exclusive U.S. distribution rights to the
publisher of the U.S. edition and the exclusive British distribu-
tion rights to the publisher of the British edition, the first sale
doctrine would not provide the British publisher of the British
edition, who wanted to sell in the United States, with a defense
to an action under Section 602 (a) of the Copyright Act. On bal-
ance it seems, therefore, that the scope of the decision is nar-
rower than one might assume at first reading. In this context,
one must finally not overlook that in the TRIPs Agreement nego-
tiations the United States has consistently argued in favor of only
national exhaustion of intellectual property rights in general. 135
b. Trademark Law
First, in trademark cases, the first important decision on the
first sale doctrine was the ruling of the Circuit Court of the
Southern District of New York in Apollinaris Co., Ltd., v. Scherer of
March 16, 1886.136 The British company Apollinaris had ac-
quired the exclusive right to sell Hungarian "Hunyadi Janos"
mineral water in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The defendant purchased the water from a German dealer and
133. Since a trademark, unlike a copyright, may last forever, exhaustion should be
assumed in a trademark case a fortiori.
134. First, U.S. commentators have concluded that the ability of companies to use
Section 602(a) of the Copyright Act in cases of goods manufactured abroad is left in-
tact. See Daniel A. De Vito & Benjamin Marks, Preventing Gray Marketing Imports After
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International, Inc., 10 No. 5J. PROPRIETARY
RTS. 2, 4 (1998).
135. Recently, New Zealand and Australia have adopted legislation favoring paral-
lel imports. This again has lead to a strong reaction from the United States. See Discus-
sion Paper for Conference supra note 91, at 5.
136. Apollinaris Co., Ltd., v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886); see BENJAMIN
PRICE & ARTHUR STEUART, AMERICAN TRADE-MARK CASES 1075 (1887).
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imported it into the United States. The court applied the
universality principle and held that:
the defendant is selling the genuine water and therefore the
trademark is not infringed. There is no exclusive right to the
use of a name or symbol... except to denote the authenticity
of the article with which it has become identified by associa-
tion, The name has no office except to vouch for the genu-
ineness of the thing which it distinguishes from all counter-
feits .... 137
In its 1923 landmark decision in A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v.
Katzel, however, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the territorial-
ity principle and ruled in favor of the trademark owner. 1 3  In
that case, the plaintiff, a U.S. corporation, had purchased a
French company's face powder business in the United States as
well as its registered trademarks used in connection with the face
powder. The plaintiff continued to import the French com-
pany's face powder and sold it in boxes that bore the mark "Pou-
dre Java" and disclosed the plaintiffs relationship to the French
company. The defendant imported the French face powder and
marketed it in the original French boxes, which bore the mark
"Poudre Riz de Java". The Supreme Court held that the defend-
ant had infringed the plaintiffs trademark rights even though it
sold only genuine face powder. Justice Holmes, in writing the
opinion of the Court stated:
It is said that the trademark here is that of the French house
and truly indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not
accurate. It is the trademark of the plaintiff only in the
United States and indicates in law, and, it is found, by public
understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff
although not made by it. It was sold and could only be sold
with the good will of the business that the plaintiff bought.139
Bourjois v. Katzel had a second consequence: the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals declined to enjoin the parallel importa-
tion of the goods in question. 4 ° In response, Congress passed
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.141 That provision prohibits
importing
137. Apollinaris, 27 F. at 20.
138. A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
139. Id. at 692.
140. A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921).
141. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1994).
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into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufac-
ture if such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by a
citizen of, or by a competitor or association created or organ-
ized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United
States .... unless written consent of the owner of such trade-
mark is produced at the time of making entry.
U.S. trademark owners may therefore use the customs laws to
exclude gray market goods. Such goods are subject to seizure. 4 2
The Secretary of the Treasury's regulation, however, con-
strued Section 1526(a) of the Tariff Act as allowing parallel im-
ports, inter alia, in cases where the foreign and the U.S. trade-
mark are owned by the same person or business entity or the
foreign and domestic trademark owners are parent and subsidi-
ary companies or "are otherwise subject to common ownership
or control.' 43 In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that the common-control exception of this regulation was
consistent with the provision in question.' 4 4
Second, the importation of so-called gray-market goods may
also be challenged under the Lanham Trademark Act.'4 5 The
relevant provisions are to be found in Sections 32, 42 and 43.
Section 42 of the Lanham Act provides, in relevant part:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or
simulate the name of ... any domestic manufacture, or man-
ufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located
in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law
affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, or
which shall copy or simulate a trade- mark [sic] registered in
accordance with the provisions of this Act or shall bear a
name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that
the article is manufactured in the United States, or that it is
142. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). For further discussion
of Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, see Jane A. Restani, An Introduction to the Gray
Market Controversy, 13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 235, 236 (1987). In K Mart, the U.S. Supreme
Court evaluated Secretary of the Treasury's regulations enforcing Section 1526. See K
Mart, 486 U.S. at 292-94.
143. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(b) (1987).
144. See KMart, 486 U.S. 281. For further commentary on the K Mart decision, see
Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray Market Exclu-
sion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373 (1994); Donna M. Lach, The Gray Market and the
Customs Regulation-Is the Controversy Really over After K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. ?, 65
CHi.-KENT L. Rav. 221 (1989).
145. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
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manufactured in any foreign country or locality other than
the country or locality in which it is in fact manufactured,
shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United
States.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or serv-
ices, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading descrip-
tion of fact, or false or misleading representations of fact,
which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsor-
ship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person . . . shall be liable in civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act. 4 6
Section 32 protects registered marks from infringement, provid-
ing that:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant,
use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or col-
orable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause consumer confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive
... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant.
Although Katzel's influence can still be felt in today's case
law, U.S. courts have not understood the decision as excluding
the first sale doctrine in trademark law. In the 1980s, courts
were generally favorable to parallel imports. Most of the courts
of appeals adopted the view that banning gray market goods in
all cases would be incompatible with fundamental principles of
trademark law as well as with the interest of competition and
with those of consumers. 147 The courts reached this conclusion
146. 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
147. See Seth Lipner, Trademarked Goods and Their Gray Market Equivalents: Should
Product Differences Result in the Barring of Unauthorized Goods from the U.S. Markets?, 18
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1029, 1034 (1990); Arif S. Haq, Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem
Trading USA, Co.: Gray Market Goods; Reason Makes a Run for the Border, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& CoM. REG. 381 (1998).
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by limiting the holding of Katzel to the specific circumstances of
the case.
A case in point is the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco of February 24,
1987.148 NEC-Japan, a manufacturer of computer chips, as-
signed its U.S. trademark rights to its wholly-owned California
subsidiary, NEC-USA, whose control remained primarily vested
in the parent company. The defendant, CAL Circuit Abco, en-
gaged in parallel importation of NEC-Japan's products. The evi-
dence indicated "that some purchasers from Abco mistakenly
thought their chips were protected by NEC-USA's servicing and
warranties." '149 NEC-USA argued that the case should be con-
trolled by Katzel. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.
It narrowed the holding in Katzel by first focusing on the fact
that in this case the U.S. company that acquired the mark had
made an arm's length contract with the manufacturer that was
clearly aimed at preventing the manufacturer from selling its
goods directly in the United States. The U.S. company had paid
a large sum for the trademarks and the goodwill associated with
them. The court next stated that because the manufacturer had
forgone all its rights to its trademark in the United States, the
U.S. owner of that mark now had complete control over and re-
sponsibility for the quality of the goods sold under that mark.
"Both these rationales presuppose the American owner's real in-
dependence from the foreign manufacturer, and courts inter-
preting Katzel have repeatedly emphasized this factor."15 The
court finally referred to a Second Circuit Court of Appeals case
that distinguished Katzel because the plaintiff was "an independ-
ent domestic trademark owner [which had] purchased the U.S.
trademark rights." '151 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "this country's trademark law does not offer NEC-
Japan a vehicle for establishing a worldwide discriminatory pric-
ing scheme simply through the expedient of setting up an Amer-
ican subsidiary with nominal title to its mark.115 2 It pointed out,
among other things, that because NECJapan and NEC-USA are
commonly controlled, "there is no danger to the latter in being un-
148. NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987).
149. Id. at 1508.
150. Id. at 1509.
151. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 321 (2d Cir. 1986).
152. NEC Elecs., 810 F.2d at 1511.
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able to control the quality of the former's products.""15
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' approach in Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v.
Dash decided on May 25, 1989.154 Weil was the wholly-owned
subsidiary of Lladro Exportadora, S.A., a Spanish firm that was
the sister corporation to Lladro, S.A., a Spanish manufacturer of
fine porcelain. Dash imported LLADRO porcelain legally ob-
tained in Spain from distributors of Lladro, S.A., and sold it in
the United States without Weil's consent. Weil filed suit arguing
that Section 526 of the Tariff Act155 and Section 42 bar the paral-
lel imports in question. The court distinguished the case from
Katzel along the lines set out by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in NEC Electronics and held that the prohibtion on parallel
imports does not apply to goods purchased by a manufacturer of
goods that was the parent corporation of the U.S. trademark
holder. The court stated that its conclusion was "consonant with
both K Mart and Katzel, and illustrate [d] the synthesis between
those Supreme Court decisions. 1 56
Third, on the whole, parallel imports may be blocked pursu-
ant to the case law on Section 1526(a) of the Tariff Act and Sec-
tions 32, 42, and 43 of the Lanham Act except when the goods
are manufactured by an entity under the common control of the
domestic trademark owner. But even in the case of common
control, the Lanham Act may be relied on to ban the importa-
tion of genuine goods bearing the original trademark if there is
a material difference between the authorized and unauthorized
goods. 157 It seems that some appellate courts have extended the
notion of material difference in such a way that banning parallel
imports has become almost the rule.
The material differences standard was, for instance,
adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1987 in Origi-
nal Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc.'58 The
court ruled that Cabbage Patch Kids dolls bearing the owner's
trademark, but manufactured abroad and intended for a foreign
153. Id. at 1510.
154. Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
155. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1994).
156. Weil, 878 F.2d at 669.
157. See Lipner, supra note 147, at 1034.
158. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
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market, were not to be imported into the United States because
the foreign dolls were accompanied by "birth certificates" and
"adoption papers" that were not in English, but in Spanish. Un-
like purchasers of U.S. dolls, purchasers of imported dolls were
unable to have the dolls "adopted" through U.S. fulfillment
houses, which would also send a "birthday card" to purchasers of
the U.S. dolls on the first anniversary of the "adoption." The
court found that the imported dolls were therefore materially
different from the U.S. dolls, with these differences creating con-
fusion over the source of the product and resulting in a loss of
the trademark owner's goodwill.' 59
In its Societe Des Produits Nestl, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc. judg-
ment of 1992,16° the First Circuit Court of Appeals also applied
the product differences test. The case was about the sale of
chocolates bearing the trademark PERUGINA in Puerto Rico.
The plaintiff, the Swiss owner of the mark, had authorized its
subsidiary, Nestle Puerto Rico, to market Italian-made choco-
lates under the mark in Puerto Rico. The defendant, Nestl6's
former Puerto Rico distributor, imported chocolates manufac-
tured by a Venezuelan company under license from Nestle. The
Venezuelan products differed from the Italian products in pres-
entation, variety, composition, and price."' The First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the "use of the same PERUGINA la-
bel on chocolates manifesting such differences is presumptively
likely to cause confusion" sufficient to support a Lanham Trade-
mark Act claim.' 6 2 Because the product differences in the case
at hand could undermine consumer expectations and very well
lead to consumer confusion, the court found the differences to
be material.' 63 The defendant was unable to show that consum-
ers did not consider these differences relevant or that retailers
159. Id. at 73.
160. Societe des Produits Nestl6, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir.
1992).
161. The district court found the following differences between the competing
products: there were different procedures of quality control; the Italian-made version
of one variety of chocolates, the so-called BACI, contained five percent more milk fat
than the Venezuelan chocolates, and other ingredients differed between the two prod-
ucts; the Italian chocolates came in a greater variety of shapes; the description of the
packaging differed; and the price of the products differed substantially.
162. Id. at 644.
163. Id. at 643.
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explained the differences to consumers. 164
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals went even further in its
1997 Herend judgment. 165 Herendi Porcelangyar ("Herendi"),
was a Hungarian corporation that manufactured fine porcelain
items such as tableware, figurines, and other pieces. The com-
pany assigned Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. ("MHI") as its ex-
clusive U.S. distributor. Herendi manufactured thousands of
items, but MHI and Herendi jointly selected only a limited
number of them for import and sale in the United States. Dia-
mond & Gem Trading USA, Co. purchased genuine Herendi
goods bearing the original mark from various sources, including
Herendi company stores in Hungary, and sold them in the
United States. Some, but not all, of the goods sold by Diamond
were among the goods imported by MHI. Herendi and MHI
sued Diamond, alleging, among other things, trademark infring-
ment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the mate-
rial differences test was "a sound one, at least when the goods are
highly artistic, luxury goods." '66 It considered that marketing
such goods is a delicate matter and that the goodwill of the
trademark may be easily destroyed. It held that "for Herendi,
maintaining the goodwill of its mark may depend on the stores
where the goods are sold, advertising, the selection of which of
the thousands of Herendi pieces will be offered for sale in this
country, and many other factors." '167 The court noted that the
differences in shape, patterns, and colors of some of the figu-
rines sold by Diamond were material as a matter of law because
"consumer choices for such artistic pieces are necessarily subjec-
tive or even fanciful, depending on each consumer's personal
artistic tastes."1 6 Whether the imports were of the same grade
and quality was irrelevant.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that its activi-
ties were protected by the first sale doctrine, holding that the
doctrine cannot be the controlling principle in the context of unau-
thorized graymarket imports. It noted expressly that, otherwise,
all graymarket importers would escape liability because "unau-
164. Id. at 644.
165. Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112
F.3d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1997).
166. Id. at 1302.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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thorized importers are never the first seller." '169 The court even
stated that no one would argue that a seller of fake goods could
escape liability "by showing that he was merely reselling the fakes
after purchasing them from the manufacturer of the pirated
works."17 ° The court allowed Diamond "to sell all pieces which
have ever been sold by plaintiffs in the United States," stating
that "in such circumstances the policies of first sale rule limiting
restraints on trade and alienation of personal property outweigh
the trademark owner's right to control its goodwill through an
exclusive distributorship arrangement."1
71
As has been rightly stated, no consistent rule of law has de-
veloped on whether product differences lead to the barring of
unauthorized goods from the U.S. market. 172 While the defini-
tion of the material difference standard in Original Appalachian
Artworks173 and in NestlM go rather far, but seem to be defensible,
this is hardly the case with regard to the Herend ruling. It has
been said that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in this
case grants U.S. trademark owners "the greatest possible protec-
tion against gray market goods"1 74 and thereby
undermines the purpose behind the material differences
standard itself, which is intended to place reasonable limits
on the territoriality of trademark law .... The American
consumer was denied product choice because of an overly
broad application of trademark law. This anticompetitive re-
sult should caution courts to enforce the material differences
standard in a more meaningful way. 175
It is in fact not obvious how consumers in the Herend case could
be misled about the origin of the goods. As far as the underlying
rationale of the first sale doctrine is concerned, the approach
taken by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals gives the trademark
owner the possibility of partitioning markets along national bor-
ders in a rather easy way. To reach that goal, it is sufficient to
make sure that in every country a different product line is cho-
169. Id. at 1303.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1304.
172. Lipner, supra note 147, at 1034.
173. Arif S. Haq has aptly stated that perhaps Spanish-speaking children in the
United States "would have been pleased to find a Cabbage Patch doll which contained
Spanish adoption papers and instructions." See Haq, supra note 147, at 400 n.132.
174. Id. at 383.
175. Id. at 398.
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sen and marketed by the official distributor. Whether this ap-
proach is compatible with the function of trademarks in a free
market economy may be doubted. As Professor Lipner has put
it, "If trademark law is used to enjoin gray market sales without
proof that the gray market goods are substantially different from
the authorized goods, trademark law will have the effect of sup-
pressing competition rather than protecting trademark rights
and goodwill."'17 6
The assumption that alleged material differences create
confusion and thereby affect the goodwill of the trademark
owner has obviously been inspired by the Chicago School.' 7 7
Whether the interests of consumers and trademark proprietors
indeed run parallel in every case is, however, doubtful. On bal-
ance, the view taken by the Herend court amounts to giving prior-
ity to the protection of goodwill over the protection of consum-
ers. Finally, considering price differences between the official
and parallel imports as a material difference, the way that the
court did in NestM,'78 amounts to turning things upside down.
One purpose of the first sale doctrine is indeed to put competi-
tive pressure on the trademark owner and on the official distrib-
utors to bring prices down.
3. Japan
Japan has a longstanding tradition of permitting parallel im-
ports of trademarked goods at least if there is a relationship be-
tween the foreign and the domestic trademark holder, and the
goods are of similar quality.179 Since 1971, courts have found
solutions that come "close to an adoption of the concept of ex-
haustion."' 8° The Japanese Supreme Court has even ruled that
not only trademarks, but also patents are subject to international
exhaustion.1 81
176. Lipner, supra note 147, at 1054.
177. See Carl Baudenbacher & Wolfgang Caspers, Markenrecht als Wirtschaftsrecht, 45
OBL 215, 223 (1996); see also De Vito & Marks, supra note 134, at 2 (stating that material
differences between officially distributed products and parallel imports "cause con-
sumer confusion and, thus, diminish good-will").
178. Societe des Produits Nestlh, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir.
1992).
179. See the discussion of the case law by Christopher Heath, From "Parker"" to
"BBS"-The Treatment of Parallel Imports in Japan, 1993 IIC 179, 180.
180. Id. at 189.
181. Judgment of July 1, 1997, Japanese Supreme Court, 1998 GRUR INT. 168.
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4. Switzerland
Switzerland is the only Western European country that is
neither a Member State of the European Union nor a Con-
tracting Party to the EEA. It has nevertheless taken over the
Trade Mark Directive in the course of its so-called "autonomous
implementation of European law program."182 On April 1, 1993,
a new trademark act entered into force with an aim, in particu-
lar, to create a legal situation compatible to the one in the Euro-
pean Union and in the EEA.183 The new act, however, remained
silent on the exhaustion issue. After heated discussions in aca-
demic literature and conflicting rulings by cantonal courts, the
Swiss Federal Supreme Court held in 1996 in Chanel that a trade-
mark right was subject to international exhaustion.184 The court
referred, in particular, to the function of origin and stated that
its finding was compatible with Article 16(1) of the TRIPs Agree-
ment. The court thereby for the first time explicitly recognized
the principle of international exhaustion. The question of
whether the material difference approach that was taken in
Omo I85 is also overruled was, however, left open. Chanel was con-
cerned with French luxury perfumes that had been purchased by
an unauthorized dealer in France and imported into Switzer-
land. The imported goods were absolutely identical to those
sold by the official Swiss dealers.
Unlike the United States and Japan, Switzerland has, since
1973, been linked with the European Community through a
Free Trade Agreement. Swiss graymarket operators have for
years been very active as exporters, in particular to Germany.' 86
With the Dyed Jeans judgment of the German Federal Supreme
Court,18 7 the German border was closed for such imports, and
the same happened with regard to the whole EC border after the
ECJ's ruling in Silhouette. It is an open question whether these
182. See Carl Baudenbacher, Zum Nachvollzug europiiischen Rechts in der Schweiz, 27
EUROPARECHT 309 (1992) (concerning this program).
183. BUNDESGESETZ vom. 28, August ueber den Schutz von Marken und Herkunfl-
sangaben (Markenschutzgesetz, MSchG) SR 232.11.
184. BGE 122 III 469; see Carl Baudenbacher & Callus Joller, Bundesgericht erlaubt
Parallelimporte, 1997 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFF FUR WIRTscHAFTWRECHT/REvuE SUISSE
DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES 91 (concerning Chanel).
185. BGE 105 II 49.
186. See, for instance, the German Federal Supreme Court's ruling in case Schwe-
izer Aussenseiter, 1989 GRUR Ir. 832.
187. Dyed Jeans, 1996 GRUR INT. 721 (F.R.G.).
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changes amount to a violation of the stand still clause in the Free
Trade Agreement.
For the sake of completeness, it may be added that the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court recently adopted the doctrine of inter-
national exhaustion also in copyright law. In its Nintendo judg-
ment of July 20, 1998,188 the court held that Nintendo Co. Ltd.,
Japan, the owner of the copyright in the video game "Donkey
Kong Land," was unable to oppose the sale in Switzerland of par-
allel imports from the United States. From a contextual perspec-
tive, the court explicitly referred to its Chanel ruling on interna-
tional exhaustion of trademark rights and stated that a different
treatment of trademarks and copyight would hardly be justi-
fied."'9 In essence, the court used a line of argument that is well-
known from the ECJ's practice under Articles 30 and 36 of the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community."' It
stated that with regard to copies put on the market abroad, the
copyright owner had its opportunity to make an appropriate re-
turn on investment. It was therefore for the owner to examine
whether there are sufficient return opportunities and to decide
based on this information where it wanted to market the work in
that country. In this regard, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court
referred indirectly to the U.S. Supreme Court's Quality King
judgment of March 9, 1998.191
5. Result
The foregoing considerations show that the United States,
Japan, and Switzerland, some of the European Union's most im-
portant trading partners, have different records when it comes
to policing parallel imports. Japanese and Swiss courts have
adopted an open approach without asking for any kind of recip-
rocal treatment. In the United States, the situation is less clear.
On the face, most of the federal appellate courts seem to favor a
free-trade oriented policy, at least in cases of common control.
Some of them are, however, rather protectionist on the merits by
using a very narrow material difference standard. One will also
notice that the U.S. government has in the past continuously
188. BGE 124 III 321.
189. Id. 2.c.
190. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
30, 36, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 26, 29 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
191. BGE 124 III 321, 2.i.
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taken the position that it considers the adoption of open policies
on parallel imports as being contrary to U.S. interests.
19 2
D. Compatibility with WTO/TRPS
1. General
Unlike the EFTA Court's Maglite ruling, the ECJ's Silhouette
judgment does not mention the terms of the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO"). It has, however, been criticized by WTO
law scholars. Frederick Abbott has stated that "the Community
once again has established a dividing line between completion of
the internal market and multilateral trade policy."a93
From a world trade perspective, the exhaustion of rights
question involves the intellectual property rights (or "IPRs")
holders' claim "that the value of protecting intellectual property
at the national and regional level exceeds the value to the world
economic system of open trade among nations and regions. "194
The question of whether present WTO rules restrict the Member
States' ability to adopt rules prohibiting parallel imports of
trademarked goods is, however, not settled. The WTO Agree-
ment pursues at the same time the objectives of removing barri-
ers to trade and (through the TRIPs Agreement) of protecting
intellectual property rights. From an intellectual property-re-
lated standpoint one could argue that these two objectives are
equivalent. On the other hand, there is an "inherent tension
between IPRs-based territorial restrictions and the rules of the
GATT 1994 and the GATS promoting the free movement of
goods and services."' 95 It may therefore be necessary "to give
priority to one set of values over the other" and that "the WTO
Agreement places a priority on the liberalization of markets,"
which justifies a presumption in that direction.'96 This conflict
is also reflected in scholarly opinions on the significance of Arti-
cle 6 of the TRIPs Agreement. The provision states that "for the
purpose of dispute settlement under this Agreement ... noth-
ing... shall be used to address the issue of exhaustion of intel-
192. See Discussion Paper for Conference, supra note 91, at 8.
193. Federick Abbott, Co-Rapporteur, First Report (Final) to the Committee on
International Trade Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel
Importation 27 (1998); see Cornish, supra note 3, at 172.
194. Discussion Paper for Conference, supra note 91, at 2.
195. Id. at 8.
196. Id. at 7.
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lectual property rights." '197 There are those who deduce from
the history and the wording of Article 6 that each WTO member
has the right to adopt its own rules regarding exhaustion of in-
tellectual property rights. Others have argued that parallel im-
port rules may be challenged under the GATT 1994 and under
other parts of the WTO agreements because Article 6 is limited
to the terms of the TRIPs Agreement.19 A middle position con-
tends that rules allowing the blocking of parallel imports are in-
consistent with the stucture and spirit of the GATT, but that Arti-
cle 6 of the TRIPs Agreement makes it impossible to successfully
attack such rules. 99 In other words, while Article 6 "certainly
means that no country can be put in the dock for deciding for or
against international exhaustion, it does not necessarily mean
that the TRIPs Agreement as such would not favor either one or
the other positition." 20 0
2. Consequences of Silhouette for Developing Countries
Rules allowing the ban of parallel imports put developing
countries at a disadvantage. They are deprived of their competi-
tive opportunities "as their national enterprises are restricted in
taking advantage of export opportunities."2°' The same holds
true for the emerging market economies of Eastern Europe.2 °2
E. Consequences for the Functioning of the European Economic Area
In view of the answers that the EFTA Court and the ECJ
have given to basically identical questions, one may ask whether
there is a conflict in the sense of Article 105 et seq. of the EEA
Agreement. Under Article 105(2) of the EEA Agreement, the
EEAJoint Committee, a body consisting of representatives of the
197. TRIPS, supra note 24, art. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1200.
198. See Thomas Cottier & Marc Stucki, Parallelimporte im Patent-, Urheber- und
Muster- und Modellrecht aus europarechtlicher und v6lkerrechtlicher Sicht, paper
presented at a conference of the Association Suisse d'Etude d la Concurrence
("ASEC"), Feb. 23, 1996.
199. Discussion Paper for Conference, supra note 91, at 16.
200. Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International Trade, 1997 IIC, 623, 629:
see Cottier, Das Problem der Parallelimporte im Freihandelsabkommen Schweiz-EG und im Recht
der WI'O-GAT T, 1995 SCHWEIZERJSCHE MITEILUNGEN OBER IMMATERIALGOTERRECHT 37,
56. Some commentators have furthermore argued that a shift from international to
regional exhaustion is in violation of Articles I, XI and XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). Cottier, supra, at 37, 56; Joller, supra note 89, at 759.
201. Discussion Paper for Conference, supra note 91, at 8, 17.
202. See Ullrich, supra note 84.
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Contracting Parties, "shall keep under constant review the devel-
opment of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities and the EFTA Court."2 3 According to Article
105(3), the procedures on dispute settlement laid down in Arti-
cle 111 of the Agreement may be applied if the Committee has
not succeeded in preserving the homogeneous interpretation of
the Agreement within two months after a difference in the case
law of the two courts has been brought before it.
The two courts seem to be following different approaches as
far as the function of a trademark in a free market economy is
concerned. It has been said that the EFTA Court has defended
the spirit of trademark law, according to which trademarks have
in the first place the function to indicate the origin of goods and
not to serve as a tool for market partitioning and banning of
parallel imports and that this free trade-oriented, progressive at-
titude runs counter to the "protectionist and reactionary deci-
sion of the ECJ." 204 There is, nevertheless, no judicial conflict in
the meaning of Article 105 of the EEA Agreement. Conse-
quently, no proceedings under Article 105(2) and (3) have been
opened. The decisive point is insofar that the EEA/EFTA States
have, unlike the EC Member States, kept their full sovereignty in
foreign trade matters and the EEA Agreement has not estab-
lished a customs union.2 0 5 The fact that graymarket goods may
be freely imported into EEA/EFTA States finally does not
amount to creating a hole in the EEA market as a whole.
According to Article 8 of the EEA Agreement, the principle
of free movement of goods applies only with regard to goods
originating in the EEA, while in the Community, a product is in
free circulation once it has been lawfully placed on the market
in a Member State. In Maglite, the parallel imports were manu-
factured in the United States and imported into Norway and
were therefore not subject to the principle of free movement of
goods within the EEA.206 The conclusion that Maglite implies
203. EEA Agreement, supra note 2, art. 105(2), O.J. L 1/3, at 26 (1994).
204. See Thomas Rist, Fundamentaler Unterschied, NEUE ZORCHER ZEITUNG [NZZ],
Aug. 19, 1998, at 5; Thomas Rist, UnliberalerEntscheid, NZZ, July 17, 1998, at 19; see also
Ullrich, supra note 84.
205. See insofar the statement of the Member of the EFTA Surveillance Authority
Bernd Hammermann, NZZ, Aug. 19, 1998.
206. MAG Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, Case E-2/
97, 1997 Rep. EFTA Ct. 127, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 331, 338-39, 24-26. Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs shared this view in his opinion in Silhouette and indeed distinguished Silhou-
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that its outcome is only appropriate for the EFTA states, but not
for the more cohesive European Union,2 °7 overlooks, however,
that the first line of argument in Maglite is clearly the one focus-
ing on the function of origin, competition, protection of con-
sumers, and free trade.20 8
CONCLUSIONS
A. The ECJ's Dilemma in Silhouette
In Silhouette, the ECJ found itself in a dilemma. It could
either allow Member States to opt for international exhaus-
tion-thereby accepting some disparities that may impede the
free movement of goods and services and may distort competi-
tion within the common market-or it could give priority to the
functioning of the single market, thereby restricting free inter-
brand trade and competition and affecting in a negative way Eu-
ropean consumers and trading partners.20 9 The court decided,
not surprisingly, to go the second way. In doing so, the ECJ ac-
ted as an executor of the intentions of the vast majority of those
Member States that had presented their view in the proceedings
and of the European Commission.210 One has to remember that
since the early 1990s, the ECJ has shown an increasing unwilling-
ness to interfere with the policies of the Member States in other
areas of European Community law as well. 211 The Italian judge
ette from Maglite based on this consideration. Silhouette International Schmied Gesell-
schaft mbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-4799, __, 43, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953, 965.
207. Cornish, supra note 3.
208. Maglite, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 331. Furthermore, Cookson in earlyJuly 1998 also
expressed the hope that the EFTA Court's Maglite ruling "may give the ECJ pause for
thought before rendering its final judgment" in order to avoid "a difference of opinion
between two courts interpreting the same piece of European legislation." Cookson,
supra note 3.
209. What Justice Scalia has said in his famous Hartford Fire Insurance dissent, that
the broad interpretation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the majority in this case "will
bring the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the
legitimate interests of other countries, particularly our closest trading partners," has at
least some truth for Silhouette as far certain (not all) trade partners are concerned.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 767, 820 (1993) (ScaliaJ,, dissent-
ing).
210. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
211. See Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, Cases
C-267-68/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101 (concerning free movement
of goods); Criminal proceedings against Harry Franz , Case C-189/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-
5909, [19981 1 C.M.L.R. 1231 (concerning compatibility of State monopolies with provi-
TRADEMARK LAW AND PARALLEL IMPORTS
of the ECJ has aptly described this attitude as a "minimalist" ap-
proach. 2
The European legislature has not succeeded in resolving
the matter. An early attempt by the European Commission to
prescribe international exhaustion of trademark rights for all
Member States in the Trade Mark Directive was defeated in the
European Parliament. Scholarly literature was split over the is-
sue of whether Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive left it for
the Member States to decide whether they wanted to maintain or
to introduce international exhaustion. 2113 The ECJ, in fact, had
to make a choice.
B. Reciprocity as a Decisive Issue
The most important novelty in Silhouette is undoubtedly the
fact that the decision has established a link between trademark
law and trade and that, in doing so, it has introduced the con-
cept of reciprocity into European intellectual property case law.
Under this classic strategy for trade cooperation, "good is re-
turned for good, and bad for bad."214 In other words, a country
need not make a trade concession without receiving something
in return 5.2 1  The United States was the first country to use reci-
procity strategically in international intellectual property law.
Reference is to be made to the history of the Semiconductor
sions in free movement of goods 1997); Commission v. France, Case C-159/94, [1997]
E.C.R. 1-5815; Commission v. Italian Republic, Case G-158/94, [1997] E.C.R. 1-5789,
[1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 373 (concerning compatibility of State monopolies with provisions
on free movement of goods and on competition); Commission v. Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Case C-157/94, [1997] E.C.R. 1-5699, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 373; Commission
v. Kingdom of Spain, Case C-160/94, [1997] E.C.R. 1-5851, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 373; Kon-
sumentombudsmannen (KO) v. De Agostini (Svenska) Forlag AB and TV-Shop I Sve-
rige AB, Cases C-34-36/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3843 (concerning scope of TV Directive
(89/552/EEC) and following Forbrukerombudet v. Mattel Scandinavia A/S & Lego
Norge A/S, E 8-9/94, 1994/95 Rep. EFTA Ct. 113, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 313); see also TV
Sverige AB v. Norwegian Government, Case E-8/97, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 318.
212. Giuseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Language, Culture and Politics
in the Life of the European Court of Justice, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 397 (1995).
213. See the account of the discussion by Claudius Marx, Internationale oder region-
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Chips Protection Act of 1984.216 Congress deliberately declined
to amend the Copyright Act, but created a special statute,
thereby keeping the United States from being bound by the ex-
isting international copyright conventions and allowing it to use
the principle of reciprocity.217 The step proved successful in a
very short time. Japan, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Switzerland,
Finland, and the European Union applied for interim protec-
tion and were prompted to enact their own statutes.218 The reci-
procity approach is also a characteristic feature of the use of Sec-
tion 301 of the U.S. Trade Act.219 Here again, the United States
has taken unilateral action by linking intellectual property and
foreign trade. 22° Furthermore, in the TRIPs Agreement, intel-
lectual property has to a certain extent become a tool to open
up foreign markets. It was once more the United States who
urged the other parties to the WTO to agree to this approach.
On the whole, one could say that the United States has set
the agenda in linking intellectual property law and foreign trade
policy, and the Europeans are reacting accordingly. 22' At least
the position of the European Commission in Silhouette and in
Maglite seems to have been influenced by U.S. foreign trade pol-
icy. Silhouette is, in other words, an expression of a certain trade
policy attitude. The "international economic law revolution"
that is expressed in the "'trade and - ' phenomenon ' 222 has
now reached European trademark law. In this respect, the ECJ's
ruling in Silhouette is an expression of the Zeitgeist.223
216. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994).
217. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901.
218. See Thomas Dreier, National Treatment, Reciprocity and Retorsion-The Case of
Computer Programs and Integrated Circuits, in GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SYMPOSIUM AT RINGBERG CASTLE, JULY
13-16, 1988 63, 71 (F.K Beier & G. Shricker eds., Weinheim-VCH Verlagsgesellschaft
1989).
219. U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
220. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1998 (1998).
221. See Nicole Telecki, The Role of Special 301 in the Development of International Pro-
tection of Intellectual Property Rights after the Uruguay Round, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 187 (1996)
(concerning use of Special 301 after conclusion of TRIPs Agreement).
222. See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 33, 36 (1996); FrankJ. Garcia, Trade and Justice: Linking the Trade Linkage
Debates, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 391 (1998).
223. Garcia, supra note 222, at 391.
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C. Future Perspectives
If one assumes that the ECJ will not overrule its Silhouette
judgment in the near future, then the ball is now with the com-
petent political authorities. One possibilty consists of amending
European trademark legislation along lines that would be posi-
tive for consumers. Taking this path substantiates the possibility
that the old proposal of the Commission to introduce the princi-
ple of international exhaustion 224 into the Trade Mark Directive
would finally become reality. If all the Member States were
bound by this principle, then there would obviously be no distor-
tions of the free movement of goods and services or of competi-
tion inside the internal market. In fact, Member States with a
long-standing free trade tradition such as Sweden, Denmark,
Finland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (with the
exception of the Netherlands, all former EFTA States), ex-
pressed their concern about the consequences of Silhouette on
parallel imports and trademark laws during the Internal Market
Council of September 24, 1998. France, Austria, Italy, Ireland,
and Germany were on the other hand reticent and concerned
about the impact on trademark proprietors. The European
Commission is carrying out an inquiry on the consequences of
the ruling.225 It is, however, more likely that the European
Union will stick with the reciprocity approach and will try to
enter into bilateral talks with its major trading partners. Interna-
tional exhaustion could therefore be an item on the agenda of
future trade negotiations. In the meantime, "many consumers
and many retailers' '22 6 will pay the price.
224. Articles 6 Draft Trade Mark Directive and 11 Draft Trademark Regulation,
COM (80) 635 Final/2 (1980).
225. See AGENCE EUROPE, Sept. 25, 1998, at 8; Discussion Paper for Conference,
supra note 91, at 12 n.36 (rightly stating that "as with all similar undertakings, the value
of this study will depend upon the methodology used ... in evaluating the impact of
parallel import rules"). Interestingly enough, the United Kingdom had in the proceed-
ings before the ECJ in Silhouette as well as before the EFTA Court in Maglite taken the
view that Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive should be construed so that national
rules providing for international exhaustion of trademark rights are unlawful.
226. Cornish, supra note 3, at 172.
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